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Do market predictions affect its reaction to UK listed industrial firms’ corporate refocusing 
announcements?  
Abstract 
This paper investigates market reaction to firms’ refocusing announcements from the perspective 
of investors’ predicted probability.  The results reveal the following: Firstly, the market reaction 
is significantly positive if managers announce the refocusing in the month when investors’ 
predicted probability is high. Secondly, there is no significant market reaction if managers 
announce refocusing in the month when investors’ predicted probability is low. Thirdly, the 
association between stock returns and investors’ high predicted probability is significantly 
negative if managers fail to announce refocusing. Fourthly, the association between stock returns 
and investors’ low predicted probability is significantly positive if managers did not announce 
refocusing.  
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1. Introduction 
Corporate refocusing activities are a source of concern for investors for a number of 
reasons: (1) Due to the change in the global economic environment during the 2000s, the 
frequency and magnitude of corporate refocusing activities undertaken by firms is higher and 
greater than previously experienced (Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Powell and Yawson, 2005; 
Gaughan 2010; Donelson, Jennings and McInnis, 2011). These are significant changes in 
firms’ business strategies and directly affect the sustainability of and trends in their earnings, 
cash flows and future dividends. (2) The material restructuring charges influence the timing 
relation between earnings, share prices and stock returns (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Mak, Strong and Walker, 2011). (3) Refocusing and restructuring charges increase investors’ 
uncertainty in relation to predictions for (and the valuation of) firms, in particular when 
managers announce refocusing subsequent to the initial announcement (Penman 2012; 
Wahlen, Stephen, Baginski and Bradshaw, 2011). Therefore, corporate refocusing 
announcements (relative to other corporate events) provide a unique and challenging 
opportunity for investigating the ways in which the market interprets and reacts to firms’ 
refocusing announcements. This also has implications for the market efficiency hypothesis.  
This paper investigates market reaction to UK firms’ refocusing announcements from the 
perspective of investors’ predicted probability. This is achieved through an examination of 
the association between firms’ monthly stock returns and refocusing announcements, and 
investors’ predicted probability prior to a refocusing announcement. Previous studies have 
revealed that firms’ market and accounting performance decline continuously during the two 
years prior to restructuring announcements (Berger and Ofek, 1999; Mak et al., 2011). This 
can mean that investors monitor and adjust predicted performance in line with the new 
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targets. They may also predict the probability of a firm announcing refocusing in order to 
plan further reaction. On the other hand, managers strategically time information disclosures 
in order to control investors’ expectations and market reaction, i.e. selectively disclosing 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ news during different scenarios (Zuckerman, 2000; Cheng and Lo, 2006; 
Kothari, Shu and Wysochi, 2009; Ge and Lenox, 2011).  
There is an expectation that the predicted probabilities of investors and the strategic 
timing of managers in relation to refocusing announcements will influence the market 
reaction to such announcements. This is due to the fact that the information asymmetry 
between investors and managers is reflected in the magnitude of investors’ predicted 
probabilities (i.e. high or low) and the timing of the managers’ announcements (i.e. early or 
delayed). The researcher proposes that four possible scenarios exist, with each prompting 
different market reactions. Firstly, managers may announce refocusing when investors’ 
predicted probabilities are high. This implies that investors already understand the gravity of 
the issues and, therefore, managers are unable to further delay the announcements. The 
market reaction can be significantly positive if investors hold a positive view of the efforts of 
the managers. It can also be significantly negative if the announcement includes incremental 
bad news that investors do not expect. Secondly, managers may announce refocusing when 
investors’ predicted probabilities are low. This implies that managers announce refocusing 
prior to the operational issues becoming severe, thereby signalling to investors an ability to 
turn the firm around. The market reaction can be significantly positive if investors agree with 
the refocusing plan, but significantly negative if they do not. Thirdly, managers do not 
announce refocusing, even when investors’ predicted probabilities are high. The market 
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performance of firms will then decline further. Fourthly, managers do not announce 
refocusing when investors’ predicted probabilities are low: this is the normal situation.  
Investors’ predicted probabilities are determined in this research through the development 
of a binominal logistic model with the ability to test whether the key factors identified by the 
takeover prediction literature explain the likelihood of refocusing, and thus assist in 
predicting the probability of firms announcing refocusing. A new method of cutoff 
probability is also devised, in order to distinguish investors’ predicted probability as being 
high or low. 
The results demonstrate that the market reaction to a refocusing announcement is affected 
by the investors’ predicted probability. Firstly, the market reaction is significantly positive if 
managers announce refocusing in the month when investors’ predicted probability is high.  
Secondly, there is no significant market reaction if managers announce refocusing in the 
month when investors’ predicted probability is low. Thirdly, the association between stock 
returns and investors’ high predicted probability is significantly negative if managers do not 
announce the refocusing. Fourthly, the association between stock returns and investors’ low 
predicted probability is significantly positive if managers do not announce refocusing. These 
results are derived from the researcher’s binominal logistic model and the new cutoff 
probabilities and are highly consistent with those derived from Palepu’s (1986) suggested 
cutoff probability. The result of the binominal logistic model confirms that the significant 
variables for predicting refocusing announcements consist of the following: (1) market and 
accounting performance in the previous twelve months; (2) book-to-market value; (3) 
leverage level; (4) non-routine change in managers during the previous twelve months; and 
(5) economic recession occurred in the previous twelve months.  
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This paper contributes to academic research and also assists managers. Firstly, there is 
currently only limited research examining the market reaction to corporate restructuring 
announcements from the perspective of investors’ predicted probability based on: (1) public 
information and (2) the information disclosure behaviour of managers1. Secondly, this paper 
suggests that managers respond to investors’ concerns and reduce information asymmetry in 
order to avoid a negative market reaction. Finally, it supports the IASB’s amendment of IAS 
37, which requires firms to disclose in a timely manner any additional details of restructuring 
charges and related activities. 
This study adopts Mak et al.’s (2011) definition of corporate refocusing as a type of asset 
restructuring, i.e. that a firm disposes of its loss-making business segments in order to focus 
on its core business or to transfer to a new core area. A firm can undertake refocusing in 
three ways: Firstly, by downsizing through divesting itself of peripheral, loss-making or 
unimportant business segments in order to focus on its original core business. Secondly, in 
addition to divesting it can increase investment in the original core business by acquiring 
related business segments. Thirdly, it can exit the original core business after a series of 
divestments, acquiring new businesses in order to enter a new core area. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the literature 
review and hypotheses; Section 3 introduces research design; Section 4 presents sample and 
data.  Section 5 analyses the empirical findings. Section 6 reports sensitivity analysis.  
                                                          
1
 Previous research has examined the variations in market reaction to restructuring announcements from different 
perspectives: (i) the kinds of restructuring activities (Brickely and VanDrunen, 1990; Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks, 
1998); (ii) the materiality of the incremental information content of restructuring announcements (Ragothaman and 
Bublitz, 1996; Bartov et al. 1998); (iii) the uncertainty resulting from restructuring announcements (Bartov et al. 
1998); (iv) the association between stock returns and the components of restructuring charges (Ohlson and Penman, 
1992; Strong and Walker, 1993, Ragothaman and Bublitz, 1996; Bunsis, 1997); (v) the economic context in which 
these restructuring charges occur (Chaney, Hogan and Jeter, 2000).  
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Section 7 tests the binominal logistic model and the new cutoff probability based on a hold-
out sample.  Section 8 serves as the conclusion of this paper.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
The institutional investors’ role in corporate governance is a controversial issue, due to 
their large proportional share of stock ownership2 and their access to both private and public 
information (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Davies, 2002; Yu, 2008). They encourage managers 
to undertake refocusing and address operational issues before they become too severe (Atiase, 
Mayew and Xue, 2006). However, individual investors can only observe the behaviour of 
institutional investors and make an analysis based on public information. They have a 
tendency to buy stocks which are attracting attention, but take into account both economic 
and emotional issues when selling stocks (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Barber and Odean, 
2008; Li, Rhee and Wang, 2009). These differences in the behaviour of these two groups of 
investors implies that they may be able to predict the probability of a firm announcing 
refocusing and so prepare their reactions to a firm’s future announcements (Ragothaman and 
Bublitz, 1996; Bartov et al., 1999; Barber and Odean, 2008)3. This implication is consistent 
with evidence of a continuous decline in a firm’s market performance in the two years prior 
to any restructuring announcements (Berger and Ofek, 1999; Mak et al., 2011).  
                                                          
2
 According to ‘Ownership of UK Quoted Shares 2010’, issued by the Office for National Statistics 
(www.ons.gov.uk) from 1963 to 2010 the ownership of institutional investors increased from 17.3% to 42.4%, while 
individual investors’ ownership reduced from 54% to 11.5%, and overseas investors’ ownership increased from 7% 
to 41.2%. In the US, institutional investors dominate both the ownership and trading of US securities, accounting for 
63% of equity holding in 2002. They have become the price-setting marginal investors (Choi and Sias, 2009).  
3
 This paper focuses solely on the market prediction and reaction, which includes the prediction and reaction derived 
from both groups of investors. In the following content, the word ‘investors’ generally means both groups of 
investors. 
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The market reaction to corporate announcements may also be affected by the selective 
disclosure behaviour of managers. An extensive body of literature infers that managers 
strategically time information disclosures according to different scenarios; i.e. they have a 
tendency to release good news earlier than bad news: (i) if the disclosure related cost is high 
(Kothari, Shu and Wysochi, 2009); (ii) if there is high information asymmetry between 
themselves and the investors (Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988); and (iii) when they use 
their firms’ shares to finance acquisitions (Ge and Lennox, 2011). However, managers may 
choose to release bad news earlier if they wish to (1) control investors’ expectations and meet 
the earnings targets of analysts (Zuckerman, 2000), or (2) release bad news before 
undertaking a share buyback in order to push down the share price (Chen and Lo, 2006).  
The magnitude of investors’ predicted probabilities (i.e. high or low) and the timing of 
managers’ announcements (i.e. early or delayed) reflect information asymmetry between 
investors and managers. The researcher conjectures that these two factors can influence the 
market’s reaction to refocusing announcements. The hypotheses below are developed in 
relation to the four possible situations and the related market reactions, as discussed.  
According to the literature on market reaction to restructuring announcements, a positive 
(negative) market reaction implies that investors expect that firms’ restructuring 
announcements will (will not) improve future performance. The following hypotheses are 
employed: 
H1a: There is a positive association between firms’ monthly stock returns and the refocusing 
announcement, if investors expect that refocusing can improve future performance.  
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H1b: There is a negative association between firms’ monthly stock returns and the 
refocusing announcement, if investors expect that refocusing cannot improve future 
performance.  
Market reaction should reflect investors’ predicted probability. If managers do not 
announce refocusing, investors may come to understand the severity of the firm’s operational 
problems by means of the disclosed accounting performance and other public information. 
Investors’ predicted probability would then be high and they would further adjust the firm’s 
stock price downward, so causing the firm’s monthly stock return to decline. On the other 
hand, if managers do not announce the refocusing, and firms do not have any serious 
operational issues, the investors’ predicted probability would be low and the changes to the 
firms’ stock price should be minimal and reflect the investors’ predicted probability. 
Therefore, the researcher hypothesises as follows: 
H2a: There is a negative association between firms’ monthly stock returns and investors’ 
predicted probability, if investors’ prediction is high.  
H2b: There is a positive association between firms’ monthly stock returns and investors’ 
predicted probability, if investors’ prediction is low.  
These two hypotheses reflect the third and fourth scenarios discussed earlier.  
If managers announce refocusing and investors predict the probability in month t, the 
market reaction to this announcement may vary, due to the fact that it indicates either that 
managers are responding to the expectation of investors or that it is a surprise to investors. If 
managers announce refocusing when investors’ predicted probability is high, investors may 
react positively (negatively) to these announcements if they believe that the refocusing 
activities can (not) improve future performance. Hence the following hypothesis: 
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H3a: There is a positive (negative) association between firms’ monthly stock returns and the 
refocusing announcement when investors’ predicted probability is high, if investors believe 
that the refocusing can (not) improve future performance. 
If managers announce refocusing when investors’ predicted probability is low, investors 
may react positively if managers can convince them of the need to undertake refocusing in 
order to address operational problems earlier and so improve future performance. On the 
other hand, investors may react negatively if they do not agree with the actions of managers 
or uncover additional bad news. Therefore, the researcher employs the following hypothesis: 
H3b: There is a positive (negative) association between firms’ monthly stock returns and the 
refocusing announcement when investors’ predicted probability is low, if investors accept 
(reject) the refocusing plan. 
H3a and H3b reflect the first and second scenarios discussed previously earlier. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Modelling the predicted probability of firms announcing refocusing activities 
In order to model investors’ predicted probability, it is first necessary to identify the 
factors they are likely to consider, based on the information they possess at the time they 
derive the prediction, and the sequence of the timeline. Rather than relying on a step-wise 
procedure to explore statistically significant variables related to firms’ refocusing decisions, 
the researcher has chosen to identify variables to construct a binominal logistic model based 
on hypotheses from the literature. This is due to the fact that the characteristics of refocusing 
firms can thus be consistently demonstrated. 
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A deterioration in performance indicates inefficient management and increases the 
probability of managers announcing a refocusing plan (see Palepu, 1986; Markides, 1995; 
Berger and Ofek, 1999; Haynes et al., 2003; Powell and Yawson, 2005; Colak and Whited, 
2006; Colak, 2010). Market performance is measured by the cumulative abnormal stock 
returns of firm i for the twelve months prior to month t (CAR12m,12). This is derived 
from the market-adjusted CAPM: firm i’s monthly return minus the return on the market 
index (Financial Times All-Shares at Datastream). Accounting performance is measured by 
the industry-adjusted return on total assets of firm i in month t (	
	,)	4, which is 
equal to firm i’s ROA in month t minus the industry ROA in the same month. Market 
performance is the more appropriate measure, as it reflects the market’s expectation of a 
firm’s future performance separately from their current performance (see Palepu, 1986). 
A key factor causing firms to announce refocusing is financial distress (Berger and Ofek, 
1999; Denis and Kruse, 2000; Hillier et al., 2009). This is also one of the main reasons stated 
by managers for their refocusing announcements. The relationship between the probability of 
announcing refocusing and the leverage level should be positive. Firm i’s leverage level in 
month t is measured by debt to equity, ,.  
Geroski and Gregg (1997) and Haynes et al. (2003) demonstrate that the larger the size of 
the firm, the larger the scale of refocusing required. The size of firm i in month t is measured 
by the log of market value, ,. 
The growth option of a firm is represented by its book-to-market value (Powell and 
Yawson, 2007). As the book value becomes closer to the market value, investors’ 
                                                          
4
 The same conclusion and similar results are reached by adopting 
tiIndadjROS , . 
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expectations of the firm’s future earnings performance decline, and the likelihood of 
managers announcing refocusing increases. Firm i’s book-to-market value in month t, 
,,	is equal to its Net Total Assets (NTA) in the six months prior to month t divided by 
its market value in month t. 
Firms are more likely to announce refocusing following corporate controlled events (e.g. 
non-routine changes in management and takeover threats see Berger and Ofek, 1999; Denis 
and Kruse, 2000; Hillier et al., 2009). Non-routine changes in management experienced by a 
firm in the twelve months prior to month t (
,12) include (1) resignation, i.e., leaving 
before the end of the appointment period without any reason being given, or (2) early 
retirement i.e., management turnover before retirement age without disclosing any reason. 
Takeover threats experienced by firm i in the twelve months prior to month t (,12	)	can 
comprise an unsuccessful takeover bid. These two variables are identified by the full text 
articles collected from Perfect Information Navigator.  
Apart from the above hypotheses concerning a refocusing firm’s characteristics, there are 
two hypotheses concerning industry characteristics. Mulherin and Boone (2000) and Powell 
and Yawson (2005 and 2007) reveal that the waves of takeovers and divestitures in the 1980s 
and 1990s in the US and the UK can be explained by industry shocks (e.g. deregulation; 
foreign competition, technological advances, industry growth, industry concentration, etc.).  
In other words, a firm’s refocusing decisions can be affected by industry shocks. The effects 
of industry shocks are measured by a dummy (	6). This is set as 1, if one firm 
operating in the same industry group as sample firm i announces refocusing in the six months 
prior to month t. Otherwise, it is set as 0.  
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Penman (2012) and Colak (2010) demonstrate that an increased number of firms 
undertake divestitures when economic conditions suffer a downturn (such as due to the 
bursting of the technology and internet bubbles in 2001 and afterwards). The effect of the 
economic recession is measured by a dummy related to the Gross Domestic Product in the 
twelve months prior to month t ( 12). It is set as 1, if an economic recession occurred 
in the previous twelve months. Otherwise, it is set as 0. 
The above factors shape binominal logistic Model 1 in the following manner: 
 
 
(1) 
where Refocus (1) denotes firm i announcing refocusing in month t; otherwise it is 0. This 
includes firms’ first and subsequent refocusing announcements during the sample period. 
Under this data setting, the association between the effects of such announcements and the 
proposed independent variables can be captured in a timely manner. In order to imitate 
investors’ predicted probability of a firm announcing refocusing in each month, Model 1 is 
estimated month by month from Jan 2000 to Dec 2010, i.e. 132 months. 
Propensity score 
The probability of firm i announcing refocusing in month t is measured by its propensity 
score ( !",), which is derived using Model (1) according to the following formula: 
( )
( )x
x
e
ep
'
'
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
1
ˆ βα
βα
+
+
+
=  
(2) 
where αˆ  denotes the intercept parameter estimate, βˆ  represents the vector of slope parameter 
estimates, and x is the vector of explanatory variables (Parsons, 2000 and 2001). 
( )
timtmtmtimti
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Cutoff probability  
Scientific studies (in statistics, medical science, pharmacy, etc.) adopt an absolute value 
of cutoff probability (such as 0.4 or 0.5) in order to classify the propensity scores as high or 
low probability. However, in the field of social sciences, the frequency of social events is 
relatively lower (King and Zeng, 2001). Corporate refocusing activities are classified as rare 
events, due to the fact that there is a low percentage of the number of firms which make 
refocusing announcements each month in relation to firms which do not. It is therefore 
inappropriate to adopt any absolute value as the cutoff probability. Moreover, the investors’ 
predicted probability of a firm announcing refocusing in the future changes over time and 
according to new information obtained; i.e., investors’ predictions need to be dynamic rather 
than static. Hence this research derives a new cutoff probability ( 12,12) which is equal 
to the number of firms making their first refocusing announcements in the twelve months 
before month t (#. 	!%&'()*,12) as a percentage of the number of firms in the same 
industry group across the same period (#. 	+!'()*,12).  
 (3) 
This cutoff probability can be compared with investors predicted probability of a firm 
announcing refocusing in month t. If the predicted probability is greater (smaller) than the 
cutoff probability ( 12,12), the firm-month observation in month t is classified as the 
one with the high (low) probability of a firm announcing refocusing. The difference is termed 
the frequency-adjusted propensity score (,!
	 !", ):  
  (4) 
mtititi mPProbbFreqadjPro 12,,, 12 −−=
mtsicdmtsicdmti offirmsNoofrefocusNomP 12,12,12, ..12 −−− =
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where it is high if ,!
	 !", > 0, and low if ,!
	 !", < 0. 
 
3.2 The market reaction to refocusing announcements and investors’ predicted probability 
This research tests the market reaction to the refocusing announcements of firms and 
investors’ predicted probability postulated by the hypotheses via the following model:  
tititititi ProbRefocusProbRefocusR ,,3,2,1, *δδδα +++=  (5) 
where , denotes the monthly stock returns of firm i in month t.  %&',  is set as 1 
when firm i announces refocusing in month t; otherwise, it is 0.  !",  is investors’ 
predicted probability of firm i announcing refocusing in month t, measured by a propensity 
score derived by estimating Model 1. %&', ∗  !",  denotes firm i issuing a 
refocusing announcement during month t, when investors derive a predicted probability in 
the same month. According to H2a and H2b, investors’ predicted probability can be either 
high or low. In order to test these hypotheses, a dummy of high predicted probability .+ℎ is 
introduced into Model 5 to form Model 6: 
ti
titititi
tititititi
ProbRefocusHighyProbHighyRefocusHighyHighy
ProbRefocusProbRefocusR
,
,,4,3,21
,,3,2,1,
             
****             
*
ε
δδδα
+
++++
+++=
 
(6) 
where .+ℎ ∗ %&', , .+ℎ ∗  !",	 and .+ℎ ∗ %&', ∗  !",  measure the 
market reaction to the refocusing announcements and the investors’ predicted probability, 
when the monthly observations are classified as those having a high predicted probability. On 
the other hand, %&', ,  !",  and %&', ∗  !",  measure the same association 
for the monthly observations are classified as those having a low predicted probability. 
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According to H1a and H1b, the coefficient of either .+ℎ ∗ %&',  or %&',  is 
expected to be positive (negative) if investors expect that a firm’s refocusing announcements 
can (not) improve future performance. 
 .+ℎ ∗  !", ( !",) denotes that investors’ predicted probability for firm i in month 
t is classified as high (low). According to H2a, if managers do not announce refocusing and 
investors believe that the firm’s future performance could further decline due to the severity 
of any operational problems, the coefficient of .+ℎ ∗  !",  is expected to be negative. 
Conversely, the coefficient of  !", is expected to be positive if managers do not announce 
refocusing and firms do not experience any serious operational issues: investors’ predicted 
probability would then be low due to H2b.  
.+ℎ ∗ %&', ∗  !",  ( %&', ∗  !", ) is an interactive variable which 
represents firm i announcing refocusing in month t, when investors’ predicted probability is 
high (low). According to H3a, the coefficient of .+ℎ ∗ %&', ∗  !", is expected to 
be positive (negative) if investors believe that the refocusing activities can (not) improve 
future performance. According to H3b, if managers announce refocusing when investors’ 
predicted probability is low, the coefficient of %&'
,
∗  !", is expected to be positive 
if investors accept the refocusing plan.  Otherwise, the coefficient of %&', ∗  !", is 
expected to be negative if investors reject the refocusing plan. 
In order to control the effects of variations in firms’ operating risks and a possible 
correlation between firms’ propensity scores across each month and industry group, dummies 
of month (0,) and industry group (1*,) are introduced into Model 6 as follows: 
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(7) 
Greene (2008) and Hill et al. (2012) state that the estimators of the above OLS model are 
inefficient relative to the maximum likelihood estimators. The usual standard errors and t-
statistics produced are incorrect, and it is therefore necessary to calculate an appropriate  
estimate of standard errors using the Heckit model to run Models 5, 6 and 7.  
 
Propensity score analysis  
In order to further confirm the results of Models 6 and 7, an analysis is undertaken based 
on propensity score matched (PSM) refocusing firms and PSM non-refocusing firms, in 
which a firm’s decision to announce refocusing is analysed as a treatment effect (Lee, 2005; 
Armstrong et al., 2010). This analysis permits an examination of the existence of any 
differences in the market reaction to firms’ refocusing announcements and investors’ 
predicted probability, based on the datasets of PSM refocusing firms and PSM non-
refocusing firms. Investors’ predicted probability (Prob) derived from Model 1 is used to 
match refocusing firms and non-refocusing firms. The matching procedure has been 
developed according to the work of Guo and Fraser (2010) and Parson’s (2000, 2001) 5 to 1 
digit Greedy Match Macro. In order to confirm the quality of the matching, the covariate 
balance between the independent variables (of Model 1) of 505 pairs of PSM refocusing 
firms and PSM non-refocusing firms is examined by means of a t-test of differences in mean, 
and non-parametric tests of differences in median (Armstrong et al., 2010; Mak et al., 2011). 
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There is no statistically significant difference between the mean and median of these 
variables (untabulated5).  
PSM non-refocusing firms are assigned with the refocusing announcement date of PSM 
refocusing firms. This approach facilitates a direct comparison of the results of Models 6 and 
7 between PSM refocusing firms and PSM non-refocusing firms. These variables are not 
introduced into Models 6 and 7, due to the fact that the matching procedure already controls 
for the effects of the following aspects of a firm: size; profitability; book-to-market value; 
leverage; takeover threats; management turnover; and other firms within the same industry 
announcing refocusing during an economic recession (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; 
Hasbrouck, 1985; Strong and Meyer, 1987; Armstrong et al., 2010). 
 
4. Sample and data  
4.1 Sampling criteria for identifying refocusing firms 
a) UK-listed industrial firms 
All firms selected in this study are UK industrial firms quoted on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) and classified according to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
(2010 version). Financial institutions and banks are excluded, due to the fact that their 
accounting policies differ from those of industrial firms. Diversified firms that appear in 
more than one SIC group are allocated to the SIC group in which their refocused business 
operates. 
b) Sample period and refocusing announcement dates 
                                                          
5
 These results are available upon request. 
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Industrial firms’ initial and subsequent refocusing announcement dates are required to 
fall between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2010. Firms announcing any refocusing 
activity in the two years prior to 2000 are excluded from the sample. 
c) Changes in business direction 
A firm must indicate the change in its business direction as one of three types of 
corporate refocusing activities (presented in Section 2), either on the occasion of the 
announcement and/or as reported by journalists at press conferences. 
All UK industrial firms without a refocusing announcement during the sample period are 
classified as non-refocusing firms. 
 
4.2 Procedures for identifying refocusing firms 
Firstly, a list of names of all UK industrial firms listed on the London Stock Exchange is 
used, including both listed and delisted (dead) firms from 2000 to 2010 from the London 
Share Price Database (LSPD) (version 2010). Secondly, refocusing firms are identified by 
searching for full text articles of their official refocusing announcements, including related 
news, conference announcements and analysis reports from one website and two databases, 
as provided by ProQuest ABI/INFORM Global New Platform and Free E-journals, as 
follows: (1) www.ukbusinesspark.com; (2) Perfect Information Navigator; (3) Financial 
Times (FT). The functions of the firm name search and the clause text search were used. The 
keywords are as follows: refocusing; restructuring; asset restructuring; rationalisation; 
reorganisation; rejuvenation; streamlining; consolidation; cost cutting/reduction/savings; 
repositioning; shake-up and reshape/reshaping.  
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4.3 Sample size and composition 
Panel A of Table 1 reveals that the above search provided 6,330 full text articles and 
4,831 short paragraphs for 841 refocusing firms between 2000 to 2010. Approximately 32 of 
these were excluded due to of a lack of data on Datastream. The final sample size is 809, of 
which: 368 are classified as downsizing firms; 430 as firms investing in their original core 
business; and 11 as firms entering a new core business. SIC 4 (comprising wholesale trade; 
retail trade; transportation and warehousing; information; accommodation and food services; 
along with further services apart from administration) are the largest group, with a 
refocusing rate of 34.81%. SIC 2 (comprising mining, quarrying, oil and gas extraction) are 
the second largest group, with a low refocusing rate of 17.54%. SIC 3 (manufacturing) has a 
refocusing rate of 30.75%. SICs 1 and 5 are small groups, with high refocusing rate of 
47.27% and 51.61%, respectively. SIC 0 is the smallest group, with a refocusing rate of 
25.81%. The average refocusing rate across all industry groups is 31.89% and there are 
1,796 non-refocusing firms. 
Panel B reveals the number of UK-listed industrial firms announcing their first refocusing 
between 2000 to 2010 as a percentage of all LSE industrial firms in each year (after 
excluding firms that had announced a refocusing in previous years). It reveals that there 
were two waves of refocusing: The first was from 5.58% in 2000 to 5.67% in 2004, reaching 
a peak of 8.01% in 2002 (which may have been due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New 
York). Although during this period UK GDP was stable and increased slightly, a number of 
industries (including airlines) were deeply affected. The second was from 5.54% in 2008 to 
5.57% in 2009. (This may have been due to the credit crunch occurring in mid-2007, with its 
effects being felt in 2008 and 2009). For the remaining periods, the rate of refocusing was 
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below 5%. The average annual percentage of firms announcing first time refocusing is 
5.65%, implying that the frequency of corporate refocusing activities in the 2000s was 
higher than in the 1990s, as established by Mulherin and Boone (2000) and Mak et al. 
(2011). 
Panel C displays the timing of refocusing announcements in relation to firms’ financial 
year-ends, month 0. It demonstrates that UK-listed industrial firms tend to announce 
refocusing during the month at the end of the financial year and during the quarter before the 
financial year end. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
4.4 Data 
Monthly market data and annual accounting data were collected from Datastream. This 
study does not impose any limitations on firms’ financial year-ends, in order to avoid any 
bias towards large firms. Outliers at the top and bottom 1% of the pooled observations of 
monthly data were excluded.  
  
4.5 Descriptive statistics  
 Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of variables for the 809 refocusing firms and 
1,796 non-refocusing firms, as defined in Section 3. Panel A demonstrates that the skewness 
of 12,45 , , , , , , , ,  and 	
	,  is statistically 
significant at 1% respectively. This is because the standard error of skewness is small when 
the number of observations (Obs.) is big. Moreover, the magnitude of skewness of 
12,45 , , and , is close to zero. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
21 
 
 The statistical results of refocusing firms and non-refocusing firms are presented in 
Panels B and C.  The skewness of 12,45, , , , , , , ,  and 
	
	, 	remains similar to the result in Panel A.  Furthermore, the means (medians) of 
12,45, , , ,, ,  and 	
	,  of refocusing firms are, in the 
main, larger than those of non-refocusing firms. These results reveal that refocusing firms are 
larger in size and have a higher leverage level than non-refocusing firms. Their performance 
is also slightly better than those of non-refocusing firms.  This makes sense as the operating 
risk (measured by ,)	of the majority of non-refocusing firms of medium and small 
size is higher than that of refocusing firms, and therefore their ability to protect themselves 
from the effects of the economic recession (from mid of 2007 to 2010) is weaker than that of 
refocusing firms. 
 (Insert Table 2 here) 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Model 1 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the summary results of 132 monthly regressions of Model 1 
between 2000 and 2010. The results reveal that the coefficients of 12,12  and 
	
	,) are negatively significant at 1% level. This implies that a continuing decline 
in performance may force managers to consider announcing refocusing, due to their 
awareness of the monitoring undertaken by investors. The coefficients of ,, ,, 
, and 
,12 are all positively significant at 1% level in relation the decision of 
firms to announce refocusing. The coefficient for  12  is statistically significant 
indicating its influence on firm’s refocusing decisions. However, the coefficients of 
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	6 and ,12 are statistically insignificant. These results are consistent with the 
hypotheses in Section 3.1 and with previous studies (i.e. Gibbs 1993; Berger and Ofek 1996; 
Denis and Kruse 2000; Haynes et al. 2003; Colak and Whited 2006; Colak 2010). 
Model 1 also derives firm i’s propensity score for each firm-month. These scores act as a 
proxy for investors’ predicted probability of firms announcing refocusing in the near future. 
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the propensity scores of refocusing and non-
refocusing firms. The mean and median of refocusing firms’ propensity scores (0.024, 0.014) 
are higher than those of non-refocusing firms (0.012, 0.007). The range between maximum 
and minimum values, with standard deviation, 25% percentile (Q1) and 75% percentile (Q3) 
of refocusing firms’ propensity scores are also higher than those of non-refocusing firms.  
The skewness of propensity scores of both refocusing firms and non-refocusing firms are 
positively significant at 1% level.  This is consistent to the result of Palepu (1986). 
 (Insert Table 3 here) 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics from 1999 to 2010 of the frequency of 
firms’ first refocusing announcements during the previous twelve months prior to firm-month 
t ( mtimP 12,12 − ). This demonstrates that the frequency of firms announcing refocusing in each 
firm-month of the pooled sample is 4.8% on average. The highest frequency is 8.9% (in 
February and March of 2002), 5.2% and 5% (in June and July of 2009) (untabulated6). The 
same trends are found in each SIC group. The frequency varies from 3.5% to 7.9%, in 
different SIC groups.  The skewness of the frequency of the pooled sample and each SIC 
group are positively significant at 5% and 1% level, except that of the frequency of SIC2 and 
SIC3.  The magnitude of the skewness of all sample groups is close to zero.  
                                                          
6
 
mtimP 12,12 −  and tibFreqadjPro ,  in each month of each SIC group are available upon request. 
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Panel B displays the descriptive statistics of firms’ frequency-adjusted propensity scores 
in firm-month t ( tibFreqadjPro , ) between 2000 and 2010. They are presented in subgroups 
of refocusing firms, non-refocusing firms, and all firms. The number of firm-months of 
refocusing firms classified as high probability is 7,838 (13.44%), in contrast with those 
classified as low probability, which is 50,472 (86.44%). For non-refocusing firms, 4,562 
(5.73%) firms’ firm-months are classified as high probability, in contrast with 74,999 
(94.27%) classified as low probability. The magnitude of tibFreqadjPro , of refocusing firms’ 
firm-months classified as high probability is the highest among those of the subgroups. The 
distributions of tibFreqadjPro ,  of high (low) firm-months are all positively (negatively) 
skewed and statistically significant at 1% level. 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
5.2 Results of Models 6 and 7 
Table 5 presents the results of Models 6 and 7, based on the datasets of the following: 
pooled sample (Allfirms); refocusing firms (Refocus); non-refocusing firms (Non-refocus); 
PSM refocusing firms (PSM Refocus); and PSM non-refocusing firms (PSM non-refocus) 
from January 2000 to December 2010. December 2010 is treated as the base month by the 
SAS programme, hence µ = 1	to	131. The total number of firm-months decreases slightly to 
136,087 due to the common observations of monthly returns and the propensity scores being 
counted.  
In Model 6, the results found in the column of Allfirms reveal that the coefficient of high 
(0.016) is positively significant. This indicates that it is significant and meaningful to classify 
firm-months by investors’ predicted probability as high or low. For the firm-months with 
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high predicted probability, the coefficient of HRefocus (–0.029) is negatively significant at 
1%. This implies that investors conclude that refocusing cannot improve future performance, 
thus, H1b is accepted.  
The coefficient of HProb (–0.444) is negatively significant at 1%. This suggests that 
investors’ predicted probability is high and that if managers do not announce refocusing, they 
adjust the firm’s stock price downward. This is consistent with the third scenario as discussed 
on p.4, and hence H2a is accepted. 
The coefficient of HRefocusProb (0.516) is positively significant at 5%. This suggests that 
there is a positive and significant market reaction to firms’ refocusing announcements in the 
firm-months when investors’ predicted probability is high. Investors accept firms’ refocusing 
announcements, as managers are seen to respond their concerns and to be committed to 
solving the operational issues. This is consistent with the first scenario discussed earlier, and 
H3a is accepted. 
For the firm-months with low investors’ predicted probability, the coefficient of Refocus 
(0.017) is positively significant at 1%. This suggests that investors expect that the announced 
refocusing can improve future performance. Hence H1a is accepted.  
The coefficient of Prob (0.38) is positively significant at 1%. This may be due to investors’ 
predicted probability being low and the firms lack of operational issues, and therefore the 
managers did not undertake the refocusing announcement. This is consistent with the fourth 
scenario situation discussed on p.5, and hence H2b is accepted. 
The coefficient of RefocusProb is negatively significant at 10%. This implies that 
investors do not accept firms’ refocusing announcement if managers announced refocusing in 
the firm-months when investors’ predicted probability is low. This may be due to the fact that 
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refocusing announcements surprise investors when their predicted probability is low and 
investors do not to agree with the managers’ plan. This result is consistent with the second 
scenario discussed earlier and H3b is accepted. The above results need to be further 
examined based on the other datasets. 
When it comes to Model 6, the results in the Refocus column are generally consistent with 
the above results of Allfirms. The coefficients of HRefocus and HProb are significantly 
negative at 1%. Thus, H1b and H2a are accepted. However, the coefficient of HRefocusProb 
is positively significant at 10% and H3a is marginally accepted. On the other hand, for the 
firm-months with low investors’ predicted probability, only the coefficient of Prob is 
positively significant at 1%, and H2b is accepted.  
In Model 6, the results in the Non-refocus column reveal that the coefficient of HProb (–
0.488) is negatively significant at 1%, and H2a is accepted. This is consistent with the third 
scenario, in which investors’ predicted probability is high and they further adjust firms’ stock 
price downwards if managers do not announce refocusing. The coefficient of Prob (0.422) is 
positively significant, and H2b is accepted. This is consistent with the fourth scenario. These 
results are consistent with those in the Allfirms and Refocus columns.  
In order to control for the effects of firm’s characteristics, industry factors and economic 
factors, Model 6 is estimated using the PSM refocus and PSM non-refocus datasets. The 
results are highly consistent with those in the Refocus and Non-refocus columns. In 
particular, for the results in the PSM non-refocus column, the coefficients of Refocus, 
RefocusProb, HRefocus and HRefocusProb are all insignificant, as PSM non-refocusing 
firms did not announce refocusing in these firm-months, unlike PSM refocusing firms.  
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In order to control for the effects of variations in firms’ operating risks and possible 
correlation between firms’ propensity scores across each month and industry group, Model 7 
introduces dummies of 0, and 1* ,	and is estimated based on the same datasets. The results 
are highly consistent with those of Model 6. The analysis based on previous results therefore 
holds. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
6. Sensitivity analysis 
This section adopts Palepu’s (1986) method of setting the cutoff probability to examine 
the sensitivity of the main results reported in the previous section. Palepu indicates that the 
optimal cutoff points can be derived by considering the following three factors: (i) the 
decision context; (ii) an appropriate payoff function; (iii) the previously stated probability. 
The optimal cutoff probability consists of the intersection point of the estimated probability 
distributions both for target and non-target samples. Accordingly, in the case of refocusing 
the optimal cutoff probability is the intersection point of the predicted probability distribution 
for firms announcing refocusing in month t (R%), and the predicted probability distribution 
for firms not announcing refocusing in month t (NR%) as demonstrated in Table 6 and 
Figure 1. This cutoff probability is used to differentiate investors’ predicted probability in 
each firm-month as high or low, in relation to the inputs into Models 6 and 7. The results of 
Table 6 reveal that 85.23% (95.87%) of refocusing (non-refocusing) firms’ firm-months have 
predicted probabilities below 0.039, and that there is only one refocusing firm’s firm-month 
with a predicted probability above 0.8. For non-refocusing firms, there are two firm-months 
with predicted probabilities above 0.5. These results are compatible with Panel B of Table 3. 
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R(%)/NR(%) demonstrates that the optimal cutoff probability lies between 0.039 and 0.044. 
It is 0.042 with R (%) and NR (%) 14%. 
(Insert Table 6 here)  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
Table 7 reports the descriptive statistics of frequency-adjusted propensity scores 
(FreqadjProbi,t) from 2000 to 2010, as derived by the above optimal cutoff probabilities. 
Approximately 13.86% (3.82%) of refocusing (non-refocusing) firms’ firm-months are 
classified as high probability. The results are similar to those in Panel B of Table 4. However, 
the distributions of FreqadjProbi,t  of high (low) probability firm-months are all positively 
skewed and statistically significant at 1% level.  
(Insert Table 7 here) 
Table 8 reports the results of Models 6 and 7 derived by adopting the above optimal cutoff 
probability. They are highly consistent with, and slightly stronger than, the main results 
reported in Table 5. Model 7, in particular, reveals that the results in the Refocus and PSM-
refocus columns demonstrate that the coefficients of high, HRefocus, HProb and 
HRefocusProb are all statistically significant at 1% and 5%. For the firm-months with low 
investors’ predicted probability, the coefficient of Prob is positively significant at 1%, while 
those of Refocus and RefocusProb remain statistically insignificant. 
For the results of Model 7 in the Non-refocus and PSM non-refocus columns, the 
coefficients of Prob, High and Highprob are all statistically significant at 1%. However, the 
coefficients of Refocus, RefocusProb, HRefocus and HRefocusProb are statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, the results in Table 5 and related analysis hold.  
(Insert Table 8 here) 
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7. Predictions on a hold-out sample 
The above empirical results are derived from the predictions of binominal logistic Model 
1 and the new cutoff probability (	 12,45) Model 3, and the reliability of these results 
depends on the ability of Models 1 and 3 to predict firms announcing refocusing in advance. 
According to Palepu (1986), in order to avoid bias, Models 1 and 3 can only be tested based 
on a separate group of firms rather than relying on the estimation sample. Therefore, 252 
industrial firms listed on London Stock Exchange in January 2011 were collected from LSPD 
version 2011. None of these firms were used in estimating the Model 1 parameters in Table 3, 
and their market and accounting data in 2010 is available. After searching for refocusing 
announcements in January 2011 at Perfect Information Navigator, four of 252 firms were 
identified as refocusing firms according to the sampling criteria presented in Section 4.1.  
The dataset of independent variables of these 252 firms are constructed according to the 
definitions in Section 3.1. The predicted probability of each firm-month was calculated using 
the coefficients of the estimated variables in Model 1 as shown in Panel A of Table 3. The 
new cutoff probability was then used to classify each firm-month as a high (low) probability 
of refocusing announcement, if the predicted probability is higher (lower) than the new cutoff 
probability. 
Table 9 demonstrates that 3 (75%) of 4 actual refocusing firms are correctively predicted 
by this model, giving Type I error of 25%.  237 (95.56%) of 248 actual non-refocusing firms 
are correctively predicted by the model, giving Type II error of 4.44%.  
Palepu’s (1989) optimal cutoff probability of 0.42 is also used in order to derive 
predictions. The results reveal that 2 (50%) of 4 actual refocusing firms are correctly 
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predicted by the model, giving Type I error of 50%. 246 (99.19%) of 248 actual non-
refocusing firms are correctly predicted by the model, giving Type II error of 0.81%.  
(Insert Table 9 here.) 
The above results are based on 252 listed industrial firms only.  This is because the entire 
population of the listed industrial firms is used to estimate binominal logistic Model 1 (Table 
3).  This approach is similar to Olhson’s (1980) approach and it can avoid the biases caused 
by the state-based sample (Palepu, 1986).  However, it reduces the size of hold-out sample 
for testing the predictive usefulness of the Model 1.  
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the market reaction to firms’ refocusing announcements from the 
perspective of investors’ predicted probability. This has been achieved by examining the 
relationship between firms’ monthly stock returns, their refocusing announcements and 
investors’ predicted probability prior to a refocusing announcement. The researcher 
postulates that the magnitude of investors’ predicted probability prior to the refocusing 
announcement along with managers’ strategic timing of announcing refocusing reflect the 
information asymmetry between them. This may have the potential to cause variations in the 
market reaction to refocusing announcements.  
A binominal logistic model and a new cutoff probability have been developed in order to 
measure investors’ predicted probability. The results demonstrate the following: Firstly, that 
the market reaction is significantly positive if managers announce refocusing in a month 
when investors’ predicted probability is high. Secondly, there is no significant market 
reaction if managers announce refocusing in a month when investors’ predicted probability is 
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low. Thirdly, the association between stock returns and investors’ high predicted probability 
is significantly negative if managers do not announce refocusing. Fourthly, the association 
between stock returns and investors’ low predicted probability is significantly positive if 
managers do not announce refocusing. 
The result of the binominal logistic model confirms that the significant variables for 
predicting the likelihood of refocusing are: market and accounting performance in the 
previous twelve months; book-to-market value; leverage level; non-routine changes of 
managers in the previous twelve months; and changes to GDP in the previous twelve months. 
The study demonstrates the ways in which investors perceive refocusing announcements 
based on their predicted probability. It also suggests that in order to avoid a negative market 
reaction managers need to respond to investors’ concerns, reduce information asymmetry and 
resolve operational problems before they become serious. It also implicitly supports IASB’s 
amendment of IAS 37 that requires firms to disclose more details of restructuring charges, 
and any related activities, in a timely manner.  
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Table 1. Sample structure of short paragraphs and full text articles, sample firms, and the distribution of 
UK listed industrial firms' first corporate refocusing announcements, 2000 - 2010. 
Panel A reports the number of short paragraphs and full text articles concerning firms’ refocusing announcements 
collected from www.ukbusinesspartk.com, Perfect Information Navigator and Financial Times (FT) from ProQuest 
ABI/INFORM Global New Platform & Free E-journals for the sample period 2000 – 2010, the number of UK 
listed industrial firms announcing refocusing, and those without any refocusing announcements. They are classified 
by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) groups. SIC0 = agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting; SIC1 = 
utilities; SIC2 = mining, quarrying and oil and gas extractions; SIC3 = manufacturing; SIC4 = wholesale trade, 
retail trade, transportation and warehousing, information, accommodation and food services and other services 
(except administration); and SIC5 = construction. Panel B presents the number of firms that announced refocusing 
from 2000 to 2010 as a percentage of the number of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) after 
excluding firms that had announced refocusing in previous years. Panel C displays the months in which firms 
announced refocusing relative to their financial year-ends (month 0).  
 
Panel A: Distribution of short paragraphs and full text articles and sample firms by industry  
 
No. of short 
paragraphs No. of full text articles   
No. of  
refocusing firms  
No. of  
non-refocusing firms 
SIC ukbuspk.com 
Perfect Information 
Navigator & FT from 
ProQuest ABI/INFORM 
Global New Platform & 
Free E-journals Total Initial Final Final 
0 58 77 135 8 8 23 
1 224 265 489 26 26 29 
2 583 867 1450 87 87 409 
3 681 830 1511 123 123 277 
4 3012 3925 6937 533 519 998 
5 273 366 639 64 46 60 
  4831 6330 11161 841 809 1796 
 
Types of refocusing activities 1 2 3 Total 
No. of firms 368 430 11 809 
 
Panel B: Frequency of the first refocusing announcements 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Frequency of first refocusing 
announcements (%) 5.58 7.77 8.01 6.82 5.67 4.58 3.95 4.78 5.54 5.57 3.88 
 
Panel C: Monthly distribution of refocusing announcements      
Financial year end 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total 
No. of refocusing firms 84 68 64 66 56 57 58 57 79 77 75 68 809 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for key variables 
This table reports descriptive statistics for variables: cumulative abnormal returns in the previous twelve months 
(,45); monthly returns (,); logarithm of market value (,); book-to-market value (,); debt-
to-equity (,); industry-adjusted ROA (	
	,); refocusing variable (Refocus) and variables in the 
previous twelve months: takeover threats (,45), non-routine changes in management (
,45), changes 
in Gross Domestic Product ( ,45) and frequency of refocusing in SIC groups (	,7).   
  Obs. Mean STD Max Q3 Median Q1 Min Skewness 
Panel A :809 refocusing firms and 1,796 non-refocusing firms: 
mtiCAR 12, −  207,790 ‒0.018 0.591 2.101 0.300 0.006 ‒0.317 ‒1.982 ‒0.105
a 
tiR ,  192,867 0.000 0.147 0.662 0.063 0.000 ‒0.073 ‒0.481 0.531
a 
i,tlogMV  192,833 1.619 0.886 4.179 2.197 1.520 0.970 ‒0.268 0.413a 
tiBTMV ,  178,061 0.761 1.012 8.929 0.973 0.518 0.250 ‒2.938 2.908a 
tiDtoEq ,  206,653 39.671 116.694 924.570 58.070 14.180 0.000 ‒771.260 1.493a 
tiIndadjROA ,  192,228 ‒0.097 0.393 0.486 0.066 0.000 ‒0.107 ‒3.802 ‒4.096a 
Refocus 375,120   1    0  
mtiTO 12, −  375,120   1    0  
mtiCmag 12, −  375,120   1    0  
mtGDP 12−  375,120   1    0  
6mtIndRef −  375,120   1    0  
Panel B: 809 refocusing firms: 
mtiCAR 12, −  82,470 0.003 0.535 2.101 0.291 0.035 ‒0.249 ‒1.982 ‒0.282
a 
tiR ,  77,393 0.004 0.135 0.661 0.066 0.000 ‒0.064 ‒0.481 0.447
a 
i,tlogMV  76,492 1.987 0.933 4.179 2.649 1.981 1.288 ‒0.268 0.067a 
tiBTMV ,  73,948 0.739 0.869 8.929 0.950 0.532 0.286 ‒2.932 2.928a 
tiDtoEq ,  76,560 57.049 123.104 924.570 81.580 36.090 4.390 ‒771.260 1.130a 
tiIndadjROA ,  75,684 ‒0.026 0.273 0.474 0.071 0.014 ‒0.046 ‒3.618 ‒5.787a 
Refocus 122,256   1    0  
mtiTO 12, −  122,256   1    0  
mtiCmag 12, −  122,256   1    0  
mtGDP 12−  122,256   1    0  
6mtIndRef −  122,256   1    0  
Penal C: 1,796 non-refocusing firms:        
mtiCAR 12, −  125,320 ‒0.032 0.625 2.101 0.307 ‒0.015 ‒0.366 ‒1.982 ‒0.013
a 
tiR ,  115,474 ‒0.002 0.154 0.662 0.061 0.000 ‒0.080 ‒0.481 0.576
a 
i,tlogMV  116,341 1.377 0.762 4.178 1.845 1.319 0.841 ‒0.268 0.477a 
tiBTMV ,  104,113 0.777 1.102 8.928 0.993 0.508 0.223 ‒2.938 2.814a 
tiDtoEq ,  130,093 29.444 111.492 918.010 39.910 4.660 0.000 ‒760.750 1.762a 
tiIndadjROA ,  116,544 ‒0.143 0.449 0.486 0.063 ‒0.017 ‒0.181 ‒3.802 ‒3.510a 
Refocus 252,864   0    0  
mtiTO 12, −  252,864   1    0  
mtiCmag 12, −  252,864   1    0  
mtGDP 12−  252,864   1    0  
6mtIndRef −  252,864   1    0  
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Obs. denotes the number of observations, STD is standard deviation.  Max represents the maximum value.  Q3 is the 
75th percentile and Q1 is 25th percentile.  Min denotes the minimum value.  
a, b and c indicate statistical significance of one-tailed z-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Monthly binominal logistic regressions results 
 
Panel A of the table reports the summary results of 132 monthly regressions of binominal logistic Model 1: 
  
 
 
 
where variables are defined in Table 2. The result is obtained by running the above model for 132 months from 2000 
to 2010. The above model also gives a firm’s i propensity score for each month due to Model 2. These scores proxy 
for investors’ predicted probability of firms announcing refocusing in the near future. Panel B presents the 
descriptive statistics of these propensity scores of firm-months. They are presented in subgroups of refocusing firms, 
non-refocusing firms and all firms.  Statistical significance of skewness is tested by one-tailed z-test. 
 
Panel A: Summary results of monthly binominal logistic regressions 
 ti ,α  mtiCAR 12, −  i,tlogMV  tiBTMV ,  tiDtoEq ,  tiIndadjROA ,  mtiTO 12, −  mtiCmag 12, −  6mtIndRef −  mtGDP 12−  
Mean ‒6.721 ‒0.610 1.007 0.237 0.001 ‒0.514 0.684 1.069 0.099 ‒0.834 
STD 3.250 0.743 0.380 0.329 0.002 0.899 5.702 2.434 2.88 0.249 
t-test (‒23.76)a (‒9.43)a (30.48)a (8.27)a (5.98)a (‒6.57)a (1.38) (5.05)a (0.4) (‒3.35)a 
Firm- 
months 137,871          
   
Panel B: Descriptive statistic of propensity scores of firm-months  
  
Firm-
months Mean STD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Skewness 
Refocusing firms 58,310 0.024 0.034 4.035E-22 0.007 0.014 0.027 0.888 5.955a 
Non-refocusing firms 79,561 0.012 0.019 8.96E-10 0.004 0.007 0.013 0.554 7.627a 
All firms 137,871 0.017 0.027 4.035E-22 0.005 0.009 0.019 0.888 6.870a 
*a indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( )
timtmt8mti
mtititititimtititi
GDPIndRefβCmag
TOIndadjROADtoEqBTMVlogMVCAR
,129612,7
12,6,5,4,3,212,1,,
                                   
0,1 RefocusPr
εββ
ββββββα
++++
++++++=
−−−
−−
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
38 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the frequency of UK listed industrial firms' first refocusing 
announcements in the previous twelve months ( 12,45) and descriptive statistics of 
frequency-adjusted propensity scores in each month. 
Panel A displays the descriptive statistics of frequency of UK listed industrial firms’ first refocusing announcements 
in the twelve months before month t in the pooled sample. The frequency is defined as the number of firms’ first 
refocusing announcements in the twelve months before month t, divided by the total number of firms in the same 
industry group in the twelve months before month t, shown in Model 3: 
 
 
 
Panel B reports the descriptive statistics of frequency-adjusted propensity scores of firm-months, ,!
	 !", , 
derived by Model 4: 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of frequency of UK industrial firms' first refocusing announcements in the 12 months before month 
t ( 12,45) from 1999 to 2010 
Firms/SIC Firm-months Mean STD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Skewness 
All firms 144 0.048 0.018 0.017 0.035 0.042 0.062 0.089  0.549a 
SIC0 144 0.051     0.05 0 0   0.05   0.1 0.158     0.445b 
SIC1 144 0.079 0.065 0 0.029 0.054   0.13 0.219   0.755a 
SIC2 144 0.035 0.016 0.012   0.02 0.034 0.047 0.078     0.36c 
SIC3 144 0.052 0.024 0 0.035 0.048 0.073 0.104     0.10 
SIC4 144 0.049 0.019 0.013 0.035 0.047 0.059 0.099   0.562a 
SIC5 144 0.058 0.034 0 0.032 0.045 0.082 0.147     0.695a 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of frequency-adjusted propensity scores (,!
	 !",) from 2000 to 2010 
  Probability Firm-
months Mean STD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Skewness 
Refocusing  High 7,838 0.041 0.059 8.44E-08 0.008 0.021 0.049 0.829 4.085a 
 Low 50,472 ‒0.040 0.024 ‒0.219 ‒0.053 ‒0.037 ‒0.023 ‒1.98E-07 ‒1.418a 
  58,310         
Non-refocusing 
firms  High 4,562 0.028 0.044 8.11E-08 0.005 0.012 0.031 0.517 3.637
a 
 Low 74,999 ‒0.039 0.021 ‒0.216 ‒0.049 ‒0.036 ‒0.024 ‒1.10E-06 ‒1.089a 
  79,561         
All firms High 12,400 0.036 0.054 8.11E-08 0.006 0.017 0.042 0.829 4.108a 
  
Low 125,471 ‒0.039 0.022 ‒0.219 ‒0.051 ‒0.037 ‒0.024 ‒1.98E-07 ‒1.277a 
 
 137,871         
*a, b and c indicate statistical significance of one-tailed z-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Results of Models 6 and 7 
The table reports the results of Model 6: 
tititititi
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and Model 7: 
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where variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. Model 6 is Model 5 with the introduction of a dummy of the firm-
months classified as having a high predicted probability of announcing refocusing in month t (High) due to its 
frequency-adjusted propensity score presented in Panel B of Table 4. Model 7 is Model 5 with the introduction of 
dummies of  high, six industry groups (1*, d = 0 to 5) and month (0	,). Models 6 and 7 are estimated based on (i) 
the pooled sample of all firms (All firms), (ii) the sub-datasets of refocusing firms (Refocus) and non-refocusing 
firms (Non-refocus), and (iii) the sub-datasets of 505 pairs of propensity score matched refocusing (PSM refocus) 
and non-refocusing firms (PSM non-refocus). There are 132 months from Jan 2000 to 2010, and Dec 2010 is treated 
as the base month by the SAS programme. Therefore, μ = 1	to	131.   For presentation purposes, the results of 
dummies of SIC groups and months are not presented, but are available upon request. 
 
  Model 6 Model 7 
  Allfirms Refocus  
Non-
refocus 
PSM 
refocus  
PSM 
non-
refocus Allfirms Refocus  
Non-
refocus 
PSM 
refocus  
PSM 
non- 
refocus 
Intercept ‒0.005 ‒0.002 ‒0.006 –0.001 0.0004 0.050 0.067 0.044 0.066 0.063 
t-test (‒7.95)a (‒2.00)b (‒7.56)a (–0.61) (0.36) (7.71)a (6.76)a (4.95)a (6.22)a (5.84)a 
Refocus 0.017 0.014  0.019 –0.010 ‒0.039 ‒0.056  –0.002 –0.070 
 t-test (2.38)b (0.033)  (2.64)a (–1.46) (‒0.42) (‒0.67)  (–0.02) (–0.74) 
Prob 0.380 0.295 0.422 0.313 0.274 1.460 1.291 1.359 1.624 1.451 
 t-test (10.44)a (6.42)a (6.84)a (5.93)a (4.71)a (5.49)a (4.12)a (2.92)a (4.51)a (3.90)a 
RefocusProb ‒0.456 ‒0.371  –0.469 0.219 ‒0.846 ‒0.677  –1.596 0.387 
 t-test (‒1.85)c (‒1.61)  (–1.77)c (0.73) (‒0.37) (‒0.32)  (–0.56) (0.47) 
High 0.016 0.012 0.019 0.009 0.011 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.016 
 t-test (7.45)a (4.28)a (5.70)a (2.94)a (3.56)a (7.01)a (5.17)a (4.13)a (3.47)a (4.66)a 
Hrefocus ‒0.029 ‒0.024  –0.038 –0.007 ‒0.028 ‒0.027  –0.051 –0.0167 
 t-test (‒2.58)a (‒2.34)b  (–3.13)a (–0.43) (‒1.98)b (‒2.08)b  (–3.10)a (–0.63) 
HProb ‒0.444 ‒0.352 ‒0.488 –0.363 –0.319 ‒0.418 ‒0.341 ‒0.438 –0.316 –0.339 
 t-test (‒10.24)a (‒6.56)a (‒6.57)a (–5.68)a (–4.84)a (‒9.32)a (‒6.15)a (‒5.52)a (–4.69)a (–4.81)a 
HRefocusProb 0.516 0.424  0.556 –0.097 0.488 0.411  0.617 0.277 
 t-test (2.04)b (1.79)c  (2.04)b (–0.29) (1.65)c (1.51)  (1.79)c (0.53) 
Adj R-Sq (%) 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.06 12.1 14.77 11.06 15.52 15.08 
F value 21.37 7.58 24.53 6.83 4.78 36.02 19.73 37.47 16.62 15.54 
Firm-months 136,087 57,798 78,289 45,507 45,507 136,087 57,798 78,289 45,507 45,507 
*a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Distribution of estimated probability of announcing refocusing in firm-months (<=>?@,A) 
for refocusing (R) and non-refocusing firms (NR)  
 
This table reports the distribution of estimated probability of announcing refocusing in firm-months ( !",) for 
refocusing (R) and non-refocusing firms (NR) obtained using the binominal logistic Model 1. The first two columns 
present the range and mid-value of the estimated probability. The third and fourth columns report the number and 
percentage of refocusing firms’ firm-month observations with the estimated probabilities falling within the indicated 
range and mid-value. The percentage of firm-month observations of each range is equal to the number of firm-
month observations falling within the range, divided by the total number of observations. These are 58,630 for 
refocusing firms and 79,241 for non-refocusing firms. The results of the non-refocusing firms are presented in the 
same manner. The final column shows the ratio between refocusing firms’ percentage to that of non-refocusing 
firms.  
These results are compatible with Panel B of Table 3.  
 
Estimated probability Refocusing firms (R) Non-refocusing firms (NR)  
Range Mid-value No. R(%) No. NR(%) R(%)/NR(%) 
0 to 0.039 0.0195 49482 85.234 75958 95.874 0.89 
0.04 to 0.044 0.042 1293 2.205 593 0.748 2.95 
0.045 to 0.049 0.047 1075 1.834 448 0.565 3.24 
0.05 to 0.059 0.0545 1654 2.811 606 0.762 3.69 
0.06 to 0.069 0.0645 1658 2.818 382 0.480 5.87 
0.07 to 0.079 0.0745 778 1.322 287 0.361 3.67 
0.08 to 0.119 0.0845 1575 2.702 545 0.685 3.94 
0.12 to 0.159 0.1395 541 0.928 199 0.250 3.71 
0.16to0.199 0.1795 251 0.431 92 0.116 3.72 
0.2to0.239 0.2195 120 0.206 53 0.067 3.09 
0.24to0.279 0.2595 72 0.124 39 0.049 2.52 
0.28to0.319 0.2995 31 0.053 20 0.025 2.12 
0.32to0.359 0.3395 30 0.051 11 0.014 3.72 
0.36to0.39 0.375 19 0.033 2 0.003 12.97 
0.4 to 0.49 0.445 31 0.053 4 0.005 10.58 
0.5 to 0.59 0.545 12 0.021 2 0.003 8.19 
0.6 to 0.69 0.645 6 0.010  0  
0.7 to 0.79 0.745 1 0.002  0  
0.8 to 0.89 0.845 1 0.002  0  
Total   58,630 100 79,241 100  
       
Optimal cutoff 
point  0.042  14%   14%    
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Figure 1. Distribution of estimated probability of announcing refocusing in firm-months for 
refocusing (R) and non-refocusing firms (NR)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of frequency-adjusted propensity scores (BCDEFGHICJKL,M) from 2000 
to 2010 obtained using Palepu’s (1986) optimal cutoff probability.  
The results of this paper can be compared with those of Panel B of Table 4. 
 
  Probability Firm-
months Mean STD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Skewness 
Refocusing  High 8,087 0.041 0.059 0.000 0.009 0.022 0.050 0.846 4.101a 
 Low 50,223 ‒0.028 0.010 ‒0.042 ‒0.036 ‒0.030 ‒0.022 0.000 0.775a 
  58,310         
Non-refocusing 
firms  High 3,040 0.039 0.052 0.000 0.007 0.020 0.049 0.512 2.932
a 
 Low 76,521 ‒0.033 0.008 ‒0.042 ‒0.039 ‒0.035 ‒0.030 0.000 1.527a 
  79,561         
All firms High 11,127 0.041 0.057 0.000 0.009 0.022 0.050 0.846 3.875a 
  Low 126,744 ‒0.031 0.009 ‒0.042 ‒0.038 ‒0.033 ‒0.027 0.000 1.196a 
  137,871         
*a indicates statistical significance of one-tailed z-test at the 1% level. 
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Table 8. Results of Models 6 and 7 obtained using Palepu’s (1986) optimal cutoff probability 
The definitions of variables remain the same as those in Table 5.  
 
  Model 6 Model 7 
  Allfirms Refocus  
Non 
refocus 
PSM 
refocus  
PSM 
non-
refocus Allfirms Refocus  
Non 
refocus 
PSM 
refocus  
PSM 
non-
refocus 
Intercept ‒0.006 ‒0.003 ‒0.007 –0.002 –0.001 0.051 0.069 0.045 0.067 0.0665 
 t-test (‒9.35)a (‒3.12)a (‒8.68)a (–1.49) (–0.46) (8.04)a (7.05)a (5.10)a (6.39)a (6.25)a 
Refocus 0.020 0.017  0.022 –0.013 ‒0.045 ‒0.063  –0.027 –0.073 
 t-test (2.27)b (2.11)b  (2.46)a (–1.70)c (‒0.49) (‒0.75)  (–0.25) (–0.77) 
Prob 0.546 0.428 0.615 0.416 0.395 1.653 1.466 1.571 1.783 1.588 
 t-test (12.25)a (7.17)a (8.77)a (6.28)a (5.45)a (6.21)a (4.66)a (3.38)a (4.93)a (4.27)a 
RefocusProb ‒0.762 ‒0.644  –0.704 0.334 ‒1.119 ‒0.931  –1.637 0.361 
 t-test (‒1.94)c (‒1.76)  (–1.76)c (0.80) (‒0.48) (‒0.44)  (–0.57) (0.44) 
High 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.016 0.017 0.011 0.014 0.014 
 t-test (4.49)a (3.62)a (1.78)c (2.46)a (1.67)c (5.84)a (5.38)a (2.09)b (3.59)a (3.62)a 
HRefocus ‒0.023 ‒0.022  –0.033 0.017 ‒0.028 ‒0.029  –0.051 –0.0001 
 t-test (‒1.92)c (‒1.96)b  (–2.54)a (1.00) (‒1.80)c (‒2.03)b  (–2.83)a (0.00) 
Hprob ‒0.571 ‒0.467 ‒0.606 –0.447 –0.396 ‒0.662 ‒0.565 ‒0.684 –0.505 –0.520 
 t-test (‒10.9)a (‒6.97)a (‒6.91)a (–5.77)a (–4.93)a (‒12.14)a (‒8.2)a (‒7.03)a (–6.16)a (–6.12)a 
HRefocusProb 0.771 0.667  0.754 –0.347 0.860 0.763  1.048 0.150 
 t-test (1.94)c (1.80)c  (1.86)c (–0.79) (2.00)b (1.93)b  (2.23)b (0.23) 
Adj R-Sq (%) 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.07 12.14 14.81 11.09 15.54 15.1 
F value 23.46 8.30 26.43 6.83 5.15 36.15 19.78 37.59 16.65 15.56 
Firm-months 136,087 57,798 78,289 45,507 45,507 136,087 57,798 78,289 45,507 45,507 
*a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 9. Predictability of binominal logistic model 1 and the new cutoff probability 
252 industrial firms listed on the London Stock Exchange in January 2011 from LSPD version 2011 
have been collected for this test. Four are identified as refocusing firms, due to the refocusing 
announcements from Perfect Information Navigator. The predicted probability of each firm-month of 
252 industrial firms is computed by using the coefficients of the estimated variables of Model 1 at 
Panel A of Table 3.   
 
  Cutoff probability   
  
	 12,45) 
Palepu’s  
(0.042) Outcome 
High predicted probability 3 2 (Correct) 
Low predicted probability 1 2 (Type I error) 
Firms announced refocusing in January 2011 4 4   
    
High predicted probability 11 2 (Type II error) 
Low predicted probability 237 246 (Correct) 
Firms did not announce refocusing in January 2011 248 248   
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